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RESTITUTION IN CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTIONS:
STOP THE RELIANCE ON RELIANCE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Maryland, it is fairly simple to cheat people out of their
money and not have to return it, even if you get caught. The key is
to cheat a very large group of people, but cheat each person out of
very little money. That way, it is not worth it for any individual to
bring a lawsuit against you. I The Consumer Protection Division
(hereinafter "CPD" or "the Division") might bring a public action
on behalf of the Feople you wronged; that is, after all, the function
of the Division. The Division might issue an injunction so that
you can not continue to cheat people. 3 The Division might even
penalize you. 4 The Division should make you give up the money
you made wrongfully, 5 but you probably do not have to worry
about that.
To make you give up the money, the Division first would have
to come up with a plan to get that money back to the people you
wronged. 6 Then, each person who wanted his or her money back
(and remember, you were smart about that, so each person only
lost a little money, but there were a lot of people) would have to
ask for it. 7 So all of the money you made from people the Division
cannot locate or people who do not want to bother reclaiming a
few dollars, or a few cents, all of that money would be yours to
keep. At least that is how it seems to go under Maryland's current
laws.
Using restitution, Maryland courts theoretically move ill-gotten
benefits from a wrongdoer's possession back to the rightful
owner's possession. 8 In reality, Maryland courts' restrictions on
restitution in cases arising under the Consumer Protection Act
(hereinafter "CPA" or "the Act") benefit offending businesses and
organizations and unduly burden consumers, contrary to the intent
of the Act. 9 Judicial interpretation and legislative reform could
redirect restitution such that courts and the Consumer Protection
Division could help consumers through restoration of their losses,
as well as punish and deter offending businesses. 10
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See generally infra note 149 and accompanying text.
See generally infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
See generally infra note 16 and accompanying text.
See generally infra note 18 and accompanying text.
See generally infra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part II(B).
See discussion infra Part III(A).
See discussion infra Part III.

393

Baltimore Law Review

394

IVol. 36

Part II(A) of this Comment will explain the CPA, how it
protects consumers and regulates businesses, and the roles reliance
and restitution play in the process. Part II(B) will differentiate
between the disgorgement and return aspects of restitution. Part
II(C) will describe court-imposed restrictions on restitution orders,
and Part II(D) will provide case examples of such restrictions in
Maryland. Part III(A) will address the outcomes and implications
of these cases, and it will suggest how and why to limit the proof
of reliance that the courts demand. Part III(B) will propose new
legislation defining two categories of consumer protection actions,
eliminating the reliance requirement in one category and
introducing fluid recovery in the other category. Part IV will
indicate how these proposals will allow for the CPD to operate
more effectively and efficiently, serving consumers and deterring
offending businesses.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Consumer Protection Act

The Consumer Protection Act, as its name indicates, protects
consumers from unfair or deceptive trade practices. 11 It also
punishes businesses for engaging in such practices and deters
businesses from similar conduct in the future. 12 The General
Assembly enacted the CPA in response to an increase in deceptive
consumer practices and a decrease in "public confidence in
merchants offering goods, services, realty, and credit.,,13 To
counteract these problems, the General Assembly promulgated in
the CPA "improved enforcement procedures" that constituted
"strong protective and preventive steps . . . to assist the public in
obtaining relief from these [unlawful consumer] practices, and to
prevent these practices from occurring in Maryland." 14 The Act
provides for the CPD to investigate businesses and organizations
that might be engaging in "unfair and deceptive trade
practice [s]," 15 issue "cease and desist order[ s]" to offending
businesses,16 "[u]ndertake activities to encourage business and
industry to maintain high standards of honesty," 17 and "[e]xercise
and perform any other function, power, and dut~ appropriate to
protect and promote the welfare of consumers." 1 The CPD has
II.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
17.
18.

See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005).
Id.
Id. § 13-102(a)(3), (b)(2).
!d. § 13-102(b)(3).
Id. § 13-204; see also § 13-30 I (defining unfair and deceptive trade practices).
Id. § 13-204(4).
Id. § 13-204(9).
Id. § 13-204(11).
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the authority to detennine an appropriate remedy.19 The Act
provides for restitution pursuant to public hearing where the CPD
fin'ds a violation of the Act 20 and as a remedy in conciliation
procedures. 21
1.

No Reliance for Proof of Violation

To prove a violation of the Act-the Erecursor to a restitution
order-the CPD need not prove reliance. 2 Reliance is defined as
"[ d]ependence or trust by a person, esp[ ecially] when combined
with action based on that dependence or truSt.,,23 A plaintiff
typically must prove reliance when arguing a case in which the
defendant obtained the plaintiffs money or property through some
24
However, Vnifonn Commercial
unfair or deceRtive practice.
Code (V.C.C.) 5 language suggests that reliance is no longer a
requirement for restitution in some contractual situations. 26
Consumer protection actions brought by the CPD also present a
special circumstance. 27

19.
20.

Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 747, 501 A.2d 48,
56-57 (1985).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-403(b)( I )(i) states the following:
If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the Division determines on the
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged violator violated this
title, the Division shall state its findings and issue an order requiring
the violator to cease and desist from the violation and to take
affirmative action, including the restitution of money or property.

21.
22.

23.
24.
25.

26.

27.

See also id. § 13-406 (available remedies include restoration of money or
property to wronged consumer).
See id. § 13-402(b)(I)(ii).
Id. § 13-302 ("Any practice prohibited by this title is a violation of this title,
whether or not any consumer in fact has been misled, deceived, or damaged as a
result of that practice."). This statute is consistent with other states' handling of
restitution in consumer protection actions. See infra note 61 and accompanying
text.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1316 (8th ed. 2004).
See Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727
(1999) (citing Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 779, 501 A.2d at 73).
The U.C.c. is a statute created by The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI) in an
effort to simplify interstate transactions by providing for laws shared among the
states.
SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS: UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE,
RESTATEMENT SECOND, UN SALES CONVENTION, UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, FORMS,
1-2 (E. Allan Farnsworth & William F. Young eds., Foundation Press 2003). All
states but Louisiana have adopted the V.C.C. such that it is the governing law
where applicable. Id. at 2. The V.C.C. applies in various commercial and
contractual matters. Id. at 2-3.
See John W. Wade & Robert D. Kamenshine, Restitution for Defrauded
Consumers: Making the Remedy Effective Through Suit by Governmental
Agency, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1031, 1038 (1969) (regarding warranties);
U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (2004).
See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Maryland's consumer law statutes, like those in most states,
derive from the Federal Trade Conimission Act (FTCA).28 The
federal courts have' held ,that the FTC has the expertise to
determine whether a practice is unfair or deceptive without regard
to the practice's actual impact on consumers. 29 "It is well
established with regard to Section 13 of the FTC Act (which gives
district courts the power to order equitable relief) that proof of
individual reliance by each purchasing customer is not needed.,,3o
The Maryland CPD also has the necessary expertise to determine
whether advertisements can deceive or mislead the public. 31
Therefore, consistent with federal practices under the FTCA,
reliance is unnecessary for the Division to prove a violation. 32
Not requiring reliance to fmd a violation 33 helps further the
legislative intent of the Act. 34 '''It would be inconsistent with the
statutory purpose for the court to stifle effective prosecution of
large consumer redress actions,'by requiring proof of subjective
reliance by each individual consumer. ",35 Such proof would be
repetitive and slow the process; requiring each consumer to bring
an individual claim would compound the problem. 36 Actions in
which the CPD may represent multiple consumers without proving
reliance expedite the matter. 37
2.

Restitution in Consumer Protection Actions

Restitution, which involves demanding something of the
wrongdoer and delivering something to the victim,38 has become
integral to consumer protection actions in various states.
28.

29.

30.
31.
32.

33.
34.
35.

36.

37.
38.

See Michael F. Brockmeyer, An Overview of State Consumer Protection Acts, 14
A.L.L-A.B.A. COURSE STUDY J. 59-60, 64 (Aug. 1989); Seth William Goren, A
Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance and Private Class Actions Under
Pennsylvania's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, 107 DICK.
L. REv. 1, 13-14 (2002).
See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 771, 501 A.2d at 69; see also Luskin's, 353
Md. at 349, 726 A.2d at 709 (quoting FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669,
674 (2d Cir. 1963».
FTC v. Figgie InCI, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605 (9th Cir. 1993).
Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 771, 501 A.2d at 69.
See id. at 770-71, 501 A.2d at 68 (citing Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695
F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982»; Simeon Mgrnt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146
n.ll (9th Cir. 1978); Spiegel, Inc. v. FTC, 494 F.2d 59, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1974».
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
David J. Federbush, Rebuttable Presumption of Reliance in Class Actions, 36
MD. BAR J. 52, 54 (2003) (quoting 1983-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 69,709 (N.D. Cal.
1983».
Goren, supra note 28, at 16 (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451,
456 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that "the number of potential individual
plaintiffs would pose a grave imposition on the resources of the court and an
unnecessary drain on the energies and resources of the litigants"».
See Goren, supra note 28, at 15.
See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 cmt. a (1937).
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Over the last thirty years, many states have adopted
legislation permitting restitution in cases where the
state attorney general or a state agency seeks to
prohibit deception, deceptive acts and practices, or
misrepresentation in connection with the sale or
advertisement of any merchandise. Maryland's
Consumer Protection Act is one such statute. These
statutes empower the courts, and in some instances
agencies, to issue orders requiring the restoration of
money or other property acquired by any of the
practices declared unlawful. 39
Black's Law Dictionary defines restitution as "[r]eturn or
restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status" or
"[c]ompensation for loss.,,40 As a remedy for unjust enrichment,
"the measure of recovery is usu[ally] based not on the plaintiffs
loss, but on the defendant's gain.,,41 The remedy applies in
contractual situations and instances of unfair or deceptive trade
practices such as "insurance frauds, investment swindles, chainletter-like schemes, gifts or contributions, gaming and
miscellaneous swindles,,,42 which the CPD works to prevent. 43
With restitution, the courts can achieve the CPA's legislative
intent to a greater extent than through civil penalties and
injunctions alone. 44 An injunction prevents future harm but does
not remedy past wrongs, whereas restitution does.
Businesses faced only with the possibility .of a
prospective injunctive order would have little
incentive to avoid commercial practices of dubious
legality. Only a substantial likelihood that
defendants who have engaged in unfair or deceptive
trade practices will be subject to restitutionary
orders will deter many with a mind to engage in
sharp practices. 45
An offender might perceive civillenalties "as merely a hunting
license for earning large profits.,,4 However, through restitution,
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 777, 501 A.2d 48,
72 (1985) (citing Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1059 n.184).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1339 (8th ed. 2004).
A court may order
compensation as part of a criminal sentence. Id.
Id.
Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1046 (citing mUltiple case examples of
where restitution was allowed as a remedy).
See MD. CODE A1'/N., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005).
See id. §§ 13-204(1), (11), 13-403(b)(I)(i~, 13-406; see also Consumer Prot. Div.
v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 155,874 A.2d 919, 936-37 (2005).
State ex rei. Kidwell y. Master Distributors, Inc.~ 615 P.2d 116, 124-25 (Idaho
1980).
Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1051.
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the court may take away all of the offender's profits and ensure
that the offender does not benefit. 47
3.

The Special Case of Public Actions for Multiple Consumers

Suits brought on behalf of multiple consumers differ from
individual consumer actions in terms of the practicality of proof of
reliance, both to establish a violation and to order restitution. 48 An
. individual who brings an action under consumer protection statutes
is aware of why he or she is bringing the action and is available to
address any Division or court concerns. The individual cannot
access his or her remedies until he or she establishes the violation,
but establishing the violation is inherent in bringing the action. 49
Reliance is a part of establishing the violation and, therefore, the
court will have established reliance already when considering
whether to issue a restitution order. 50 In contrast, if the Division
represents multiple consumers, then proof of reliance involves the
additional steps of identifying and contacting each consumer, and
having each consumer indicate reliance as the individual consumer
did. 51 To streamline the process, the Division need not prove
reliance to order restitution in an action involving multiple
consumers. 52

B.

The Dual Nature of Restitution

Restitution is a two-part remedy, each part serving one aspect of
the CPA's legislative intent. 53 In consumer protection actions, the
first part is the disgorgement of the unlawfully gained profits from
the offending business, which discourages future offenses. 54 '''The
restitution claim ... is not aimed at compensating the plaintiff but
at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits it would be unjust for
him to keep. ",55 In contract terms, restitution prevents "gain by
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

ld. at 1034.
Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 778-79, 501 A.2d
48, 72-73 (1985).
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-401. Individual attempts at recovery begin
when the consumer files a complaint with the CPD; that complaint must state the
"particulars of the violation." /d. § 13-401(a). Then, the CPD investigates the
allegations, id. § 13-40 I (b), and, if appropriate, attempts conciliation, seeks an
injunction, and/or holds a hearing. Id. §§ 13-402(a)(I )-(2), 13-403(a).
"Traditionally, to be entitled to restitution because of misrepresentation [as which
CPA violations under section 13-301 qualify], the plaintiff must prove reliance on
a material misrepresentation." Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 777, 501 A.2d at 72
(citing RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 9 (1937)).
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II (C).
See supra notes 11-12, 14 and accompanying text.
Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 776, 501 A.2d at 71 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW
OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973)).
Id. (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 (1973)).
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the defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee.,,56 The
Federal Trade Commission promoted restitution as a measure that
should "drive the huckster out of the marketplace without
interfering with the rights of the great majority of honest
businessmen.,,57
The second part of restitution is the return to the consumers of
what the consumers lost through the unfair or deceptive trade
practice; this part provides protection to the consumers. 58 Often,
restitution offers consumers their best possibility of recovery. 59
Restitution presents a more compelling case to the courts than
other interests because restitution "involv[es] a combination of
unjust impoverishment with unjust gain.,,6o This second part
allows the Division to actualize the legislative intent by not only
removing the profits from the violator but also returning them to
the consumers.
C.

The Role of Reliance in Restitution

In Maryland and other states, restitution applies without regard
to the victim's reliance when the state's consumer protection
division brings an action on behalf of multiple consumers,61 but
courts still limit the Division's ability to order restitution. 62 The
Maryland CPD may issue a general order of restitution without
indicating how the Division will address consumer reliance, but the
circumstances under which such an order is appropriate are very
limited. 63 Some state courts require forethought by the state's
consumer protection division on how money disgorged from the
56.

L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages:
Part I, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 54 (1936).

57.

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, REpORT ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER
PROTECTION PROGRAM 19-20 (1968).
See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 53-54. Even in restoring consumers to
their position before the unfair trade practices, "[t]he measure of recovery is the
value of the benefit received by the defendant." Wade & Kamenshine, supra
note 26, at 1034. Emphasis remains on disgorgement of the violator. See

58.

generally id.
59.
60.

61.

62.
63.

Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1033.
Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 56. The result of restitution is that the other
regains what he or she lost, but that result is secondary to the primary object of
disgorging the offender. See id. at 52-54.
See, e.g., Mo. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-302 (2005); Consumer Prot. Div. v.
Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 162,874 A.2d 919, 940-41 (2005); Comm. on Children's
Te1evision, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668-69 (Cal. 1983)
(restitution orders without proof of reliance are acceptable if necessary to prevent
unfair practices); State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116,
123 (Idaho 1980); Dix v. Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co., 415 N.W.2d 206, 209
(Mich. 1987).
See discussion infra Part II(D)(1) & (4).
See Morgan, 387 Md. at 165-66, 874 A.2d at 943 (quoting Consumer Prot. Div.
v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 781, SOl A.2d 48,74 (1985» (general
restitution order inappropriate if some consumers "may not want refunds").

400

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 36

offending business shall reach the consumers. 64 The California
Supreme Court only permits the attorney general to obtain
restitution specifically for identified consumers. 65 That court
previously had emphasized the importance of the disgorgement
aspect of restitution:
[T]he Legislature obviously intended to vest the
trial court with broad authority to fashion a remedy
that would effectively "prevent the use . .. of any
practices which violate [the] chapter [proscribing
unfair trade practices]" and deter the defendant, and
similar entities, from engaging in such practices in
the future. The requirement that a wrongdoing
entity disgorge improperly obtained money surely
serves as the prescribed strong deterrent. 66
Yet the California Supreme Court later limited restitution by
classifying the aforementioned language as a "comment" rather
than a holding. 67 The Idaho Supreme Court requires a procedure
"by which consumer claims may be efficiently and fairly
processed.,,68 The procedure provided a means to effect "the
greatest possible good for the greatest possible number of
consumers who have common problems and complaints vis-a-vis
the seller.,,69 The court did not address the possibility that where
the group of consumers involved is discrete, mailing refunds might
be more efficient than processing consumer claims. 70 Mailing
refunds might indeed obviate the need for individual claims. 71
The Maryland courts follow the Idaho precedent by requiring
that before the CPD may award restitution to specific individuals,
the CPD's restitution "order [must provide] a mechanism for
processing individual claims."n Individuals must take affirmative
action to state not only that they purchased the goods or product at
issue but also that they relied on the violator's acts. 73 As a result,
if the CPD does not present a procedure that requires consumer
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

73.

See, e.g., Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 780-81, 501 A.2d at 73-74, and cases
cited therein.
See Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718,732 (Cal. 2000).
Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'! Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 56 (Cal. 1979) (citation omitted).
Kraus, 999 P.2d at 724.
State ex reI. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho 1980).
Id. (quoting Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 649 (N.J. 1971)).
Mailing refunds would involve sending each identifiable customer his or her
share in a stamped envelope. Processing claims might result in fewer shares to
mail, yet it would involve company time dedicated to reading, sorting, verifying
and recording each claim received.
See discussion infra Part III(B).
Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 775, 501 A.2d 48,
71 (1985); see also Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 166,874 A.2d
919,943 (2005).
See Morgan, 387 Md. at 166, 874 A.2d at 943.
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action toward obtaining reimbursements, the ill-gotten gains are
not available to the consumers.74 Rather, even though restitution
applies and the courts can prove a violation, the profits may remain
in the hands of the offender. 75
Two sides exist to restitution, 7~ but these requirements of
reliance are relevant only to one side. On that side, the court
should only award restitution to individuals who suffered loss due
to the violation. 77 Therefore, the court might ask the CPD to have
individuals prove their reliance if it is not evident. The other side
of restitution considers only the profit the violation generated,
without regard to the number of individuals harmed or the amount
of harm caused to each. 78 Consumer indications of reliance have
no bearing on this side. 79 Therefore, denying general orders
because "some . . . consumers may not want refunds,,8o or
requiring that the order include a plan for individuals to prove
more than their purchase "might [result in] less effective
implementation of the statute's goals. On balance, it is better for a
court to keep the consumer's burden at a minimum, even though in
rare cases some injustice to the defendant might result.,,81 The
CPD should be able to use restitution to deny CPA violators their
profits without having to address individual claims from the outset.
D. Grants and Denials of Restitution in Maryland
1.

Consumer Protection Division v. Consumer Publishing CO. 82

Maryland's requirements for restitution orders resulted from a
case in which a company, Consumer Publishing, advertised and
sold diet pills to Maryland consumers through newspaper
advertisements. 83
The advertisements promoted the pills as
appetite suppressants that increased the body's metabolic rate and
thereby caused weight loss.84 Following an administrative hearing
on complaints filed by the CPD, the Division issued a cease and
desist order regarding Consumer Publishing's advertising
practices. 85 The order further required restitution to all customers
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

!d.
See generally id.
See discussion supra Part I1(B).
See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 56, at 53-54.
See id.; Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 770-71, 776,
50 I A.2d 48, 68, 71 (1985).
See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1061-62.
Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74.
Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1061-62.
304 Md. 731,501 A.2d 48.
ld. at 737,501 A.2d at 51.
ld. at 739-40, 501 A.2d at 52-53.
Id.
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who purchased the pills during the period of advertising, and it
indicated that Consumer Publishing's business records would
identify the purchasers. 86 Consumer Publishing challenged the
restitution order. 87 The Circuit Court vacated the Division's final
order,88 and the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. 89 The
Court of Appeals held "that the Division may enter a general order
of restitution without proof of purchaser reliance, as long as the
order provides a mechanism for processing individual claims.,,9o
The appropriate procedure is:
Purchasers should be notified that they may obtain a
refund; in order to be entitled to such refund, they
should be required to state that they relied on the
false impressions created by the advertising ... , It
should not be necessary that each purchaser present
additional evidence that he was actually deceived
and relied on the misrepresentations in the
advertisements. 91
This procedure prevents consumers who were not deceived from
receiving restitution. 92
The court further held that in Consumer Publishing, the order
"did not provide a procedure for processing individual consumer
claims.,,9 In coming to this holding, the court considered cases in
other jurisdictions,94 such as the Idaho case discussed above. 95
The court did not consider that, for the Idaho courts, the purpose of
a procedure was efficiency and fairness. 96 Nor did the court
consider that the plan to use the company's business records, and
not to provide restitution to repeat customers, took efficiency and
fairness into account. 97 Rather, the court held the procedure
inadequate because "[s]ome of [the identified] consumers may not
want refunds.,,98
The court did not explain under what
circumstances someone would not want to receive a refund. 99
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 775-76, 50 I A.2d at 7I.
Id.
Id. at 740-41, 50 I A.2d at 53.
Id. at 741, 501 A.2d at 53.
Id. at 775, 501 A.2d at 71.
Id. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74. An individual claim is "the consumer's statement that
he/she relied on the targeted misrepresentations." Federbush, supra note 35, at
52.
Consumer Publ 'g, 304 Md. at 781, 50 I A.2d at 74.
Id. at 775, 501 A.2d at 71.
Id. at 779-80, 501 A.2d at 73.
See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
See State ex rei. Kidwell v. Master Distributors, Inc., 615 P.2d 116, 126 (Idaho
1980). See generally Consumer Publ 'g, 304 Md. 731, 50 I A.2d 48.
See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at 71-72.
Id. at 781, 50 I A.2d at 74.
See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48.
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Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division 100

In Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Division, the Court of
Appeals considered the situation in which the group of affected
customers was not clearly defined. 101 Through television and
newspaper advertisements, Luskin's advertised that consumers
who purchased a set amount of the retailer's electric and household
goods and services would receive a free airline ticket. 102
Following a series of communications and court actions regarding
the advertisement and its revisions, which the CPD alleged
violated the CPA, 103 the CPD issued a final order for monetary
relief beyond restitution. l04 On appeal, the Court of Appeals held
that "[t]he appropriate remedy under the circumstances of this case
is to require Luskin's to disgorge the net profit it realized from the
deceptive practice." lOS
The court differentiated this case from Consumer Publishing
because this case did not involve a discrete group of consumers. 106
Consumer Publishing's customers all responded to an
advertisement and, therefore, "reliance on the seller's advertising
was inherent to a great degree in customer purchases.,,107 In
contrast, some Luskin's customers might have purchased without
seeing the advertisements and, consequently, the restitution
procedure should exclude such customers. 108

3.

B&S Marketing Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Protection
Division 109

Special circumstances arise when "there is no dispute that every
person who entered such transaction paid money as a result of the
'prohibited practice. '" II 0 In B &S Marketing Enterprises, LLC v.
Consumer Protection Division, the defendants were businesses that
offered a two-step process, advertised by television and radio, for
consumers to obtain cash immediately. II I The defendants first
"bought" 112 consumers' electronics for $100 cash per item and
then leased the electronics back to their original owners at $30 per
100.
IO\.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
III.
112.

353 Md. 335, 726 A.2d 702 (1999).
See id. at 339,726 A.2d at 703-04.
ld.
ld. at 342-43, 726 A.2d at 705-06.
ld. at 382-83, 726 A.2d at 725.
!d. at 385, 726 A.2d at 726.
ld. at 387, 726 A.2d at 727.
ld.
ld.
153 Md. App. 130,835 A.2d 215 (2003).
!d. at 169 n.15, 835 A.2d at 238 n.15.
ld. at 139-40, 835 A.2d at 220-21.
The defendants did not acquire possession but merely recorded the electronics'
serial numbers. ld. at 141, 835 A.2d at 221.
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15-day perlod.1\3
The defendants did not explain to their
customers that the lease could be terminated at any time by simply
returning the electronics to the company; consumers thought that
they had to repay their loans to repurchase their electronics. 114 The
administrative law judge and the Division's Final Order required
restitution. I 15 The. Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals
affirmed. 116 The Court of Special Appeals held that, because it
was clear that all consumers' expenses resulted from violations of
the CPA, "the Division did not have to show customer reliance to
order restitution.,,\17 The court did not mention a procedure
associated with restitution. I IS

4.

. D···
~,r
119
lVlszon v. morgan
Consumer Protectzon

In 2005, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the need for a
procedure to address individual claims and emphasized the
unlikelihood of an appropriate general order of restitution. 12o
Although the court had not had the opportunity to review B&S
Marketing, less than two years later, the court had-and seizedthe opportunity to address these issues in Consumer Protection
Division v. Morgan. 121 The case· invoh:ed a complex scheme
through which a property-investor,. a mortgage len.der and two
appraisers enticed "unsophisticated, first-time homebuyers" to
purchase homes with only $1,000 down. 122 The defendants in the
administrative hearing had advertised on television, through the
mail, and in newspapers. 123 They falsified documents, altered
prices without informing the buyers, and deceived customers at
various points in the home buying process, among other unfair and
deceptive trade practices. 124 As a result of their collaborative
efforts, they sold 48 homes to customers who otherwise might not
1l3.
114.
liS.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
. 122.
123.
124.

Id. at 139-41,835 A.2d at 220-21.
Id. at 142-44, 835 A.2d at 222-23.
Id. at 146-48,835 A.2d at 225-26.

Adopting what it called a "middle course," the Division only required
appellants to pay as restitution to former customers the "net monetary
gain" appellants received from violating the Consumer Protection Act
. . .. Although that approach was less drastic than other alternatives,
it had the desirable and lawful effect of preventing appellants from
being unjustly enriched by their wrongful conduct.
Id. ·at 169, 835· A.2d at 238.
Id. at ISO, 171, 835 A.2d at 227, 239.
Id. at 169,835 A.2d at 238.
See generally B&S Mktg., 153 Md. App. 130,835 A.2d 215.
387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919 (2005).
Id. at 165-66,874 A.2d at 942-43.
Id.
Id. at 140, 150,874 A.2d at 927, 934.
Id. at 150,874 A.2d at 933.
Id. at ISO-54, 874 A.2d at 933-36.
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have been able to purchase homes. 125 As a further result, many of
the customers defaulted on their mortgages, which they could not
actually afford. 126 One of the lenders had an early default claim
rate "236% higher than the average rate of other comparable
lenders in Baltimore." 127
The CPD issued a cease and desist order, a restitution order, and
assessed civil penalties,128 but the Court of Appeals vacated the
restitution order as inadequate. 129 The Court of Appeals held that
the CPD "can issue a general order of restitution without proving
an individual consumer's reliance, but may not award restitution to
the individual consumer without a showing of individual
reliance." 130 By quoting its Consumer Publishing holding, the
court renewed its belief that proof of individual reliance is
necessary because "[s]ome . . . consumers may not want
refunds." 131
The court held that such restitution orders
(accompanied by procedures) could only be issued in situations
involving "similarly situated individuals." 132
In Morgan, the court increased the level of required proof of
individual reliance for some circumstances by holding that
statements of reliance were not enough; the consumers had to
testify. 133
Thus, whether restitution necessitates consumer
testimony must be decided on a case by case basis. 134 The CPD
argued against additional testimony, 135 or other proof of reliance,
on the premise that reliance was inherent. 136 The court rejected the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

135.

136.

!d. at 140,874 A.2d at 927-28.
ld. at 152,874 A.2d at 934.
ld. at 153,874 A.2d at 935.
ld. at 155,874 A.2d at 936-37.
ld. at 167,874 A.2d at 944. the CPD had the possibility of awarding restitution
at a later date through a procedure involving testimony to prove individual
reliance. /d. at 168,874 A.2d at 944.
ld. at 166,874 A.2d at 943.
!d. (quoting Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731,781,
501 A.2d 48, 74 (1985».
ld. at 165,874 A.2d at 943.
ld. at 162,874 A.2d at 941.
!d. ("Consumer testimony ... is not necessarily required to prove reliance for
restitution. Whether consumer testimony is required to support a specific
restitution order depends on the facts and circumstances of each case."). Contra
Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731,770-71,776,501
A.2d 48, 68-69 (1985) ("The Federal Trade Commission has consistently
analyzed only the advertisements themselves, without requiring testimony by
consumers . . . . [T]he Consumer Protection Division also has the expertise
necessary to make that determination without testimony by consumers or
consumer experts.").
The administrative hearings. already involved testimony from seventeen
consumers and others, over the course of eighteen days. Morgan, 387 Md. at
149,874 A.2d at 933.
ld. at 166-67,874 A.2d at 943.
[T]he consumers could not have obtained the FHA-insured mortgages
without the appraisers, sellers, and lenders' misrepresentations ....
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CPD's argument "because some consumers could have been
Some knew of the
complicit or willing purchasers." 137
misrepresentations or might have accepted the inflated prices
simply for the opportunity to purchase a home. 138
III. ANALYSIS
A.

The Current Status of Restitution Orders at Maryland
Common Law

Following Morgan, consumers may find themselves without
easy remedies and the CPD may find itself without effective
measures to take against businesses that violate the CPA. 139 The
CPD is the expert in these matters,140 and the expert consistently
ordered restitution in the aforementioned cases. 14 Yet the courts
held the restitution orders inadequate in two of the four cases. 142
The courts should give the Division the deference the General
Assembly intended it to receive. 143
So that the consumer protection process may maintain its
efficiency and effectiveness, Morgan must be held to its facts. 144
Perhaps the Court of Appeals will reconsider the effects of its
holding when it next considers a restitution order for a consumer
protection action. In the meantime, the lower courts have little
recourse to avoid the required procedure entailing consumer action
prior to receipt of restitution, but they can limit it as much as

137.
138.
139.
140.

141.

142.

143.
144.

Similarly, the purchasers would not have been able to obtain the
mortgages necessary for the property sale had [defendant] Shpritz not
made illegal payments to the consumers and misrepresented the
consumers' financial situation and had [defendants] American
Skycorp and Woody not approved the mortgages.
[d.
[d. at 167,874 A.2d at 943.
[d. at 167,874 A.2d at 943-44.
See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
See Morgan, 387 Md. at 149, 874 A.2d at 933; Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer
Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 747, 771,501 A.2d 48, 56-57, 69 (1985) (CPO has
expertise to determine deceptiveness of advertisements; CPO determines
appropriate remedy for CPA violations; the courts should not perform CPO's'
role).
See Morgan, 387 Md. at 155, 874 A.2d at 936-37; Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer
Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 382-83, 726 A.2d 702, 725 (1999); Consumer Pub/'g,
304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at 71; B&S Mktg. Enters., LLC v. Consumer Prot.
Div., 153 Md. App. 130, 148,835 A.2d 215, 226 (2003).
See Morgan, 387 Md. at 167, 874 A.2d at 944 (order inadequate); Luskin's, 353
Md. at 385,726 A.2d at 726; Consumer Pub/'g, 304 Md. at 775-76, 501 A.2d at
71 (order inadequate); B&S Mktg., 153 Md. App. at 170-71,835 A.2d at 239.
See supra note 140.
See infra notes 147-150 and accompanying text.
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possible.1 45 Morgan presented a rare scenario in which consumers
might have knowingly violated statutory law through their
interactions with the defendants. 146 In most consumer protection
actions, consumer violations should not be a factor. Therefore,
consumer testimony typically should not be necessary and
consumer proof of reliance should be no more than a statement to
that effect.
The courts should limit requirements for individual consumer
statements, thereby lowering the bar for general restitution orders,
so that the procedure for restitution furthers the legislative intent
rather than thwarting it. If the CPD issues restitution orders in
compliance with the Morgan holding, the violator will not have to
provide any restitution to individual consumers until and unless the
consumers take action to demonstrate reliance. 147 Even though
that consumer action may be nothing more than writing a letter, it
may be enough to deter some consumers from pursuing the
remedy.148 In cases of minimal harm to individual consumers, the
consumers may not find the action worth their while. 149 In cases
of more significant harm, consumers may not hear of the remedy
or may not understand their role. 150 The General Assembly
designed the CPA to protect all levels of consumers. 151 To protect
educated and uneducated, motivated and unmotivated, gullible and
skeptical consumers, the courts should not create hurdles when the
consumers have already suffered loss. Making it harder for
consumers to access restitution increases the likelihood that the
money remains with the violator and the consumers do not receive
refunds. 152 Such results are contrary to the General Assembly's
intent. 153
The Maryland courts should consider the purpose behind the
introduction of procedures for restitution orders and uphold the law
accordingly. The Consumer Publishing holding was issued over
145.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

152.

153.

AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND STRATEGIES 5 (Aspen
Publishers 2d ed. 2003) ("[L]ower courts are required to follow decisions from
higher courts in the same jurisdiction.").
Morgan, 387 Md. at 167,874 A.2d at 943-44.
See id. at 163-64, 874 A.2d at 941-42.
Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 758, 501 A.2d 48,
62 (1985).
[d. at 758, 501 A.2d at 62; see Fletcher v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 591 P.2d 51, 54
(Cal. 1979).
See Fletcher, 591 P.2d at 54 (the "lack of awareness of legal rights on the part of
most borrowers" contributes to the impracticality of individual actions).
See McGraw v. Loyola Ford, Inc., 124 Md. App. 560, 579, 723 A.2d 502, 511
(1999) (construing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 to protect "ordinary
consumers" as a broader group than those protected under the FTCA).
See Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 165-66,874 A.2d 919, 942-43
(no general order when individuals not similarly situated; no specific order
without consumer statement).
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005).
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twenty years ago as a restatement of common law in other
jurisdictions, such as Idaho. 154 Idaho's purpose in consumer
protection law, like Maryland's, involved efficiency and
faimess. 155 To that end, Maryland courts should not add extra
steps to the restitution process when they are not necessary, nor
should Maryland courts allow violators to keep their ill-gotten
gains. 156 Individual consumer claims contradict the purpose of
allowing the CPD to bring a suit on behalf of multiple consumers
by reintroducing multiple claims for the same wrong. 157 Where a
discrete group of consumers suffered loss due to a violation such
that their reliance is inherent in the transaction and the offender's
profit is determinable, the CPD should be able to deliver restitution
without the step of receiving individual claims from consumers. 158
Consumer interest should not be a factor when the case does not
involve restoration, but the Maryland Court of Appeals set the
precedent that general orders are inappropriate when some
consumers might not want restitution. 159 The Louisiana courts
also consider the consumer's interest in restitution: "Whether or
not a consumer is entitled to restitution is dependent upon proof
whether he was, in fact, aggrieved, the extent to which he was
aggrieved or, indeed, whether he desires restitution . ...,,\60 Under
traditional rules for restitution, where restoration-returning the
product to the deceitful seller-accompanies restitution, a
consumer might not want a refund because the consumer might not
want to return the product. 161
However, under the CPA,
restoration is not always a part of restitution. 162 None of the
aforementioned cases involved restoration. 163 Thus, it is only a
question of whether individual consumers want to receive
money.l64 Some might appreciate the product they receive, despite
154.

155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.

164.

Consumer Prot. Div. v. Consumer Publ'g Co., 304 Md. 731, 780-81, 501 A.2d
48,72-74 (1985).
See supra note 154 and accompanying text. See generally State v. Andrews, 73
Md. App. 80, 85, 533 A.2d 282, 285 (1987) (purpose of public action is to reduce
time involved in litigation and make recovery accessible to more consumers).
See generally supra note 154 and accompanying text.
See Andrews, 73 Md. App. at 85,533 A.2d at 285.
See B&S Mktg. Enters., LLC v. Consumer Prot. Div., 153 Md. App. 130, 169
n.15, 835 A.2d 215,238 n.15 (2003).
See Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. at 781, 501 A.2d at 74, quoted in Consumer Prot.
Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 166,874 A.2d 919, 943 (2005).
State ex rei. Guste v. Gen. Motors Corp., 354 So. 2d 770, 776 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(emphasis added).
See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at \041.
See Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Prot. Div., 353 Md. 335, 386, 726 A.2d 702, 727
(1999) (no restoration when impractical).
See generally Morgan, 387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919; Luskin's, 353 Md. 335, 726
A.2d 702; Consumer Publ'g, 304 Md. 731, 501 A.2d 48; B&S Mktg., 153 Md.
App. 130, 835 A.2d 215.
See generally supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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the evidence of misrepresentation or fraud, but that is not a reason
to deprive them of a refund. To the contrary, a consumer's
continued belief in a product or service that either is ineffective or
detrimental to the consumer indicates the need for acts such as the
CPA that protect such consumers. 165 Whether the consumer
believes in the product is irrelevant; the facts prove that the
consumer deserves a refund. 166 Furthermore, it is hard to conceive
of the circumstances in which a consumer, content or not with his
or her purchase, would object to a refund.

B.

Legislative Reform

In the interest of efficiency, effectiveness, and eliminating the
roadblock placed by Morgan, the General Assembly should
consider additional provisions for the CPA. Actions that the CPD
bring could be divided into two categories: those involving discrete
consumer groups where reliance is evident without proof, and
those involving a less-defined set of victims. 167 Each category
needs a different form of legislative protection.
1.

Restitution without Consumer Action

The first provision should allow restitution without consumer
action for discrete consumer groups where reliance is evident
without proof. 168 The question of whether consumers want a
refund should not be considered. 169 Consumers who did not want
the refund could mail it back. 170 Consequently, the statute would
supersede Morgan, except as it applies to situations where
165.

166.

167.

168.
169.
170.

See CHARLES B. SHAFER, MARYLAND CONSUMER LAW: SALES, LEASES AND
FINANCING 130-31 (MICPEL 2006) (complicit purchasers in Morgan should not
be penalized for falling for a scheme they did not initiate).
Consider Consumer Publishing: The CPD and the court required disclosure that
the pills did not do most, if not all, of what they claimed to do and would not
work at all without dieting. 304 Md. at 739-40, 501 A.2d at 52-53. Yet
consumers who reordered did not receive refunds because reordering indicated
satisfaction with what might be little more than a placebo and coincidental weight
loss. See id. at 775-76, 50 I A.2d at 71. GulIible consumers should not be
punished for their credulousness. See SHAFER, supra note 165, at 131.
The victims might be less defined either because they are unknown or because
not all should receive refunds, such as was the case in Morgan. See Morgan, 387
Md. at 167, 874 A.2d at 943-44.
See discussion supra Part III(A).
See discussion supra Part I1I(A).
Consumers could also decide to spend their refunds on other consumer products,
as a good number would probably choose to do. Thus, it is not only the
consumers who would benefit from this reform but also other businesses. Those
businesses that did not violate the Act and therefore could receive customer
orders would be the ultimate re~ipients of a percentage ·of the disgorged funds. In
effect, they would be rewarded for their compliance and consumers would benefit
from the redirection to honest businesses and the perhaps more reliable products
the honest businesses sold.
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consumers might have been involved in the scheme. 171 The statute
would eliminate the required procedure for processing individual
claims to the extent that it required consumers to write in, stating
their reliance and requesting their restitution. 172 This provision
would further the le¥islative intent of protecting the customers and
doing so efficiently. 73
The General Assembly could amend the Commercial Law
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, section 13-403, with
the addition of the following italicized words to subsection (b)(I):
(b)( 1)(i) If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the
Division determines on the preponderance of
evidence that the alleged violator violated this title,
the Division shall state its findings and issue an
order requiring the violator to cease and desist from
the violation and to take affirmative action,
including the restitution of money or property
(iv) Restitution shall be made without consumer
action when reliance is evident from the
transaction. Consumer interest in restitution shall
not be a factor unless restitution involves
restoration of money or property to the alleged
violator.
Section 13-402, regarding conciliation procedures, could
include the same language in subsection (b)(I), as suggested in
italics:
(b)( 1) A written assurance of discontinuance or a
settlement agreement may include a stipulation or
condition for the violator or alleged violator to:
(ii) Make restitution to the consumer of money,
property, or any other thing received from the
consumer in connection with a violation or alleged
violation of this title. Restitution shall be made
without consumer action when reliance is evident
from the transaction.
Consumer interest in
restitution shall not be a factor unless restitution
171.

172.
173.

See supra notes 135-138.
However, the courts should assess consumer
involvement to see whether their involvement should disqualifY them. See supra
note 165.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005); see supra notes 155-157
and accompanying text.
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involves restoration of money or property to the
alleged violator.
With such language in place, consumers would more frequently
receive their refunds and violators would not be able to retain their
profits simply due to lack of consumer action. 174 The process
would be quicker and cheaper without the steps involved in
individual claims. 175 Yet, when appropriate, the courts could
follow their current protocol. 176 The overall result would be a
more effective implementation of the CPA.
2.

Fluid Recovery

The second provision should allow fluid recovery as a remedy
when restitution is inappropriate without consumer action. Fluid
recovery, also called cy pres distribution,177 "is a means of putting
unclaimed class funds to their 'next best use,' [which] usually
takes the form of a consumer trust fund or an across-the-board
price reduction for a defendant's product until the ill-gotten gains
are disgorged.,,178 It would help fully accomplish the purpose of
the Act 179 by disgorging the offending businesses, even when the
courts cannot identify or locate the wronged consumers or the
consumers cannot (or simply do not) prove reliance. 180 Fluid
recovery would also be useful in cases involving "individual
damages ... so small that notification and distribution costs exceed
the recoverable amount or reduce it to a pittance.,,181 The remedy
should only apply when disgorgement is appropriate yet the courts
cannot distribute the funds to the consumers,182 either for the

174.
175.
176.
177.

178.

179.
180.
181.

182.

See discussion supra Part III(A).
See discussion supra Part IIJ(A).
See supra notes 91, 135-138, 172 and accompanying text.
See Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 348 N.W.2d 685,689 (Mich. App. 1984);
see also Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App.
2005) (,"Fluid recovery' refers to the application of the equitable doctrine of
cypres (putting charitable trust funds to the next best use if the trust purpose can
no longer be accomplished) in the context of a modem class action.") (citing
Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 999 P.2d 718 (Cal. 2000)).
Stan Karas, Note, The Role of Fluid Recovery in Consumer Protection Litigation:
Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, 90 CAL. L. REV. 959, 961-62 (2002)
(citing Natalie A. DeJarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution
to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 729, 730,
753-55, 759-65 (1987)).
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-102(b)(3) (2005).
See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655,675 (7th Cir. 1981).
DeJariais, supra note 178, at 730 (citing State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d
564, 565 (1986) ("35 to 40 cent recovery per pair of jeans, with an average
individual recovery of $2.60-$3.00")); Cartt v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr.
376, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that damages to individual consumers
misled by defendant's advertising were "trifling").
Madrid, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225 n.8 (quoting Kraus, 999 P.2d at 725).
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aforementioned reasons or because the consumers conspired with
the business in violating the Act. 183
Fluid recovery in consumer protection actions is a logical
progression from the current practices in Maryland and other
states. 184 In Morgan, the court noted that the Division's Final
Order mentioned that '''it is possible that a person other than the
consumer, such as the FHA, might be the appropriate recipient of
some of the restitution. '" 185 The coUrt's reference to this language
shows that the Division considers-and the court approves ofrestitution as a means of prohibiting the violator from profiting,
even when the profit is not restored to the consumers.186 The Act
already provides for the Division to "[a]ssist, develop, and conduct
programs of consumer education and information through
publications and other materials prepared for distribution to
consumers," 187 an area that could benefit from fluid recovery fund
money. 188 In Illinois, the A.ppellate Court concluded that fluid
recovery was appropriate for an action brought under Illinois's
Consumer Fraud Act:
Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that defendants violated
the Consumer Fraud Act. "The Act is a regulatory
and remedial enactment intended to curb a variety
of fraudulent abuses and to provide a remedy to
individuals injured by them." Section Iia of the
Act provides that "[the] Act be liberally construed
to effect the purposes thereof."
It is quite
established that "[t]he provision is a clear mandate
from the Illinois legislature that our courts utilize
the Act to the utmost degree in eradicating all forms
of deceptive and unfair business practices and grant
appropriate' remedies to injured parties." This
legislative intent and mandate necessarily include
policies of deterrence, disgorgement, and
compensation. Thus, we hold that fluid recovery is
available in at least the claim brought under the
Consumer Fraud Act. 189
The Maryland courts similarly construed the CPA to grant the
Division "broad authority to construct the roadblock necessary to

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See, e.g., Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125,874 A.2d 919 (2005).
See infra notes 185-92 and accompanying text.
Morgan, 387 Md. at 168 n.24, 874 A.2d at 944 n.24.
See generally id.
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-204(8). (2005).
See infra notes 189-190 and accompanying text.
Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (citations omitted).
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'close all roads to the prohibited goal,' [albeit] within the confines
of the statutory authorization." 190
Furthermore, other states and the federal courts recognize and
employ fluid recovery in class actions. 191 Fluid recovery is
being used or advocated increasingly where direct
distribution of settlement funds to individual class
members is impractical; and where important
consumer goals, such as disgorgement of ill-gotten
gains from and deterrence of future over-pricing
and manipulation of market allocation by the
offending entities, can be achieved. 192
Such situations present themselves in the first part of restitution as
a remedy in CPD-initiated actions in Maryland. 193 A California
Law Review article noted the similarity between class actions and
actions brought under consumer protection laws, suggestin the
applicability of fluid recovery to consumer protection actions. ft94
Fluid recovery is appropriate as a remedy when the CPD brings
a suit, and the Maryland legislature should codify it as a part of the
CPA. 195 Courts have noted that fluid recovery should not apply in
all circumstances, but rather when its application "is consistent
with the policy or policies reflected by the statute violated.,,196
Courts should consider "to what extent the statute embodies
policies of deterrence, disgorgement, and compensation." 197 The
190.
191.

192.

193.
194.

195.

196.
197.

Consumer Prot. Div. v. George, 383 Md. 505, 521, 860 A.2d 896, 905 (2004).
See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981); Madrid v. Perot Sys.
Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Boyle v. Giral, 820
A.2d 561, 569-70 (D.C. 2003); Miles v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 00L0112, 2001
WL 34366710, at *2 (Ill. Cir. Feb. I, 2001); Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 348 N.W.2d 685, 691-92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc.
v. Dir. of Revenue, 113 S.W.3d 192, 195-96 n.l (Mo. 2003) (en banc) (Wolff, J.,
concurring); Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2004); Ritter, Laber & Assocs., Inc. v. Koch Oil, Inc., 623 N.W.2d 424,
429 (N.D. 2001) (citing N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(0)); see also Dallas County Cmty.
Coli. Dist. v. Bolton, 89 S.W.3d 707, 722 (Tex. App. 2002) (fluid recovery not
held unlawful by Texas courts).
Boyle, 820 A.2d at 569-70 (citing New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 44 (2d
Cir. 1996); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987);
New York v. Keds Corp., No. 93 CIY 6798,1994 WL 97201 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21,
1994) (footnote and citation omitted).
See discussion supra Part I1(B).
Karas, supra note 178, at 962 ("Although representative actions under the UCL
[which is California's consumer protection statute] are not class actions, they
provide plaintiffs with many of the benefits of class actions without imposing
some of the burdensome legal requirements of that device, such as those related
to standing, notice, and class certification.").
The scope of this Comment does not reach the question of whether fluid recovery
should apply to class actions.
Simer, 661 F.2d at 676 (quoted in Cice/ski,.348 N.W.2d at 690-91) (footnotes
.
omitted).
Id. (quoted in Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 691) (footnotes omitted) ..
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objectives of Maryland's CPA are to discourage future violations
and to protect consumers, and restitution already exists as a
statutory remedy elsewhere in the Maryland Commercial Code. 198
Therefore, fluid recovery is an appropriate remedy under the
Maryland CPA.
With fluid recovery, the required proof of reliance would still
stand between consumers and the recovery of any losses, but the
proof would not hinder disgorgement of the offending
businesses. 199 Fluid recovery provides a procedure for handling
proof of damages through an administrative claims process rather
First, the court orders the
than prolonged litigation. 200
disgorgement of the violator and establishes a fund for the
money.201 Second, wronged consumers make individual claims
and receive refunds upon proof of reliance,202 as provided for in
Morgan. 203
Alternatively, the violator might first provide
restitution to all consumers who submit claims and then the
violator would remit the remainder of his or her profits to create
the fund. 204 Third, "[t]he remainder of the fund is: (1) distributed
through the market, usually in the form of reduced charges, or (2)
used to fund a project which will likely benefit class members.,,205
Examples of uses include "nonprofit organizations or foundations
to support projects that will benefit the class or similarly situated
persons, or that promote the law consistent with the objectives of
the underlying lawsuit.,,206
Codifying fluid recovery under the CPA would provide an
appropriate use for the money obtained from disgorging the
offending business. 207 As explained in a California Court of
Appeals decision:

198.
199.
200.
201.

202.
203.
204.

205.
206.
207.

See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-102(b)(3), 13-402(b)(I)(ii), 13403(b)(I)(i), 13-406 (2005).
Cj supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See Miles v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 00L0112, 2001 WL 34366710, at *2 (Ill.
Cir. Feb. 1,2001).
See Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 689. The federal legislature has codified federal
trust funds for similar circumstances involving individuals whom the court cannot
locate. See Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1056 (quoting 31 U.S.c. §
725p (1964) and citing 28 U.S.c. § 2042 (2001)). "Thus, 'the United States has
no beneficial interest ... but holds the money as a statutory trustee for the
rightful owners when and if they are determined by the court.''' Id. (quoting In
re Moneys Deposited Etc., 243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957)).
See Cicelski, 348 N.W.2d at 689.
See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384 (West 2004). In either version, the consumers
should submit claims by a court-proclaimed deadline so that it is clear what
money remains for distribution in Step 3.
Gordon v. Boden, 586 N.E.2d 461,467 (III. App. Ct. 1991).
Madrid v. Perot Sys. Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 225 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
See infra notes 208-210 and accompanying text.
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The theory underlying fluid class recovery is that
since each class member cannot be compensated
exactly for the damage he or she suffered, the best
alternative is to pay damages in a way that benefits
as many of the class members as possible and in the
approximate proportion that each member has been
damaged, even though some class members may not
receive compensation and some non-class-members
will benefit from the distribution. 208
That way, the second part of restitution, involving refunds, would
not present a roadblock to the first part, involving disgorgement. 209
The court could provide "the next best use,,210 of the money after a
direct refund to individual consumers, and the violator would not
be able to retain the ill-gotten goods. 211
The General Assembly could amend the Commercial Law
Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, section 13-406, to
include another available remedy, and the General Assembly could
add a section codifying fluid recovery under the CPA. For section
13-406, the General Assembly could augment subsection (c) as
follows in italics:
(c) The court may enter any order of judgment
necessary to:
(4) Disgorge from a person any money or real or
personal property acquired by him by means of any
prohibited practice.
The General Assembly could then codify fluid recovery as
follows:
Collection and Distribution of Restitution in
Actions Brought by the Consumer Protection
Division 212
(a) This section applies only to actions brought by
the Consumer Protection Division.
(b) Prior to the entry of any restitution order, the
court shall determine the total amount that the party
found in violation of the Act must surrender. The
court shall also set a date when the parties shall
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Madrid, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 225 n.8 (citing Kraus v. Trinity Mgmt. Servs., Inc.,
999 P.2d 718, 726 (Cal. 2000».
See discussion supra Part 11(8).
See Kraus, 999 P.2d at 726.
See supra notes 20 I, 204.
Language adapted in part from CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 384 (West 2004).
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report to the court the total amount that the
defendant actually paid to the affected consumers as
per the restitution order. After receiving the report,
the court 213 shall amend the judgment to direct the
defendant to pay the remainder of the restitution,
plus interest on that sum at the legal rate of interest
from the date of entry of the initial judgment,
according to a distribution schedule that the court
shall provide with the amended judgment, to a
combination of one or more of the following
entities:
(i) nonprofit organizations or foundations to support
projects that will benefit the consumers or similarly
situated persons,
(ii) nonprofit organizations or foundations that
promote the law consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the underlying cause of action,
(iii) child advocacy programs, or
(iv) nonprofit organizations providing civil legal
services to the indigent.
The court shall ensure that the distribution of any
unpaid residual derived from cases brought under
Maryland law, against out-of-state defendants, shall
provide substantial or commensurate benefit to
Maryland consumers.
IV. CONCLUSION
Restitution orders should help defrauded consumers and "deter
unscrupulous businessmen from pursuing new schemes.,,214
Holding Morgan to its facts will allow restitution to reach more
consumers; overturning Morgan on this issue would do so more
effectively.215 Legislative reform also can help the CPD realize
the purpose of the Act. 216 Eliminating the need for individual
proof of reliance where reliance is inherent in the violation and the
consumers form a discrete group will provide better consumer

213.

214.
215.
216.

This proposed language does not provide for the other means of fluid recovery
(mandatory reduction of the defendant's prices) because such reduction might
attract new customers to the defendant, thereby indirectly benefitting the
defendant. But see Delarlais, supra note 178, at 753 ("This solution is useful
because the benefits of lower prices are bestowed on a similar, although 'fluid'
class of plaintiffs. ").
Wade & Kamenshine, supra note 26, at 1050.
See discussion supra Part III(A).
See discussion supra Part III(B).
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protection and enhanced efficiency. 217 Adding fluid recovery will
further discourage businesses from future violations by making it
unlikely that a business could retain its wrongful gains. 218 As a
result, the CPA will work more effectively.219

Lisa Yurwit

217.
218.
219.

See discussion supra Part III(8)( I).
See discussion supra Part III(8)(2).
See discussion supra Part III.

